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he sautrantikas believe that the 
inner perception or knowledge of objects 
like pot and cloth are brought about by the 
varied external experiences in the form of the 
sense perception of these objects and are non-dif-
ferent from the contact of the senses with these 
objects. If these external objects were absent, a 
corresponding knowledge of these objects would 
be impossible and so, we would have to infer that 
the cause of the knowledge of these objects is the 
variety of external objects and this is not direct 
perception. And hence, the existence of the ex-
ternal world is established only by inference. The 
Vaibhashikas—whose philosophy is also called 
bahya-pratyakshavada, the school of external-di-
rect perception—hold that if the external objects 
did not exist, there would be no relation with 
them of the inner organs and there would be no 
possibility of inferring them. To infer fire from 
smoke, there should have been a prior experience 
of the direct perception of fire where there was 
smoke. Therefore, though absolutely speaking, the 
sense perceptions are false; on the relative plane, 
the external world of objects is not established 
just by inference but also by direct perception. So, 
for inferring fire from smoke, one cannot do away 
with the external fire. Hence, to infer the external 
sense objects their external presence is also a must. 
The opinions of these two schools is being 
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seen as one because the stand of both these 
schools is one in that they do not give an abso-
lute reality to the external sense-objects. Taking 
these two schools as one, they are being quashed 
and uprooted in the following three verses:
yee¢eb YeesiÙeb Øepeuhev#eefCekeâceCegÛeÙeb Yeeskeäle= mebIeelecevle:
mkeâbOeeveeb hebÛekeâ_Ûeso=Meefceefle megiele: he=ÛÚŸeleeb Jesoyee¢e:~
efkeâvles ceeveevlejsCe Øeefceleefceocegle Øeewef{js<ee lJeoerÙee
eEkeâ Jee ceesnelØeueehe: efkeâceLe 
pe[ peieefÉØeefuehmee kegâyegæs~~ 1.22 ~~
Bahyam bhogyam prajalpan-kshanikam-
anuchayam bhoktri sanghatamantah
Skandhanam panchakanchedrishamiti sugatah 
pricchhyatam vedabahyah.
Kinte manantarena pramitamidamuta 
praudhiresha tvadiya
Kim va mohatpralapah kimatha jada jagad-
vipralipsa kubuddhe. (1.22)
We ask the agnostic Buddhists, who denounce 
the Vedas: ‘O dull and evil-minded ones, you 
blabber that all the material objects outside 
the body—produced out of earth and the 
other elements, form and other perceptions, 
and eyes and other sense-organs—having only 
a momentary existence and the atoms of earth 
and the other elements are the things that are 
experienced. You call the five skandhas in the 
body, which are momentary like the external 
objects, the group of experiencers. You have 
inferred the momentariness of these objects 
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and skandhas through some other means of 
knowledge like direct perception. Or could it 
also be said that this imagination of momen-
tariness of objects is the greatness of your in-
tellect? Or is it just your babble caused out of 
delusion? Or is it to dupe people?
The Buddhists believe that one hetu, cause, 
leads to another cause. One cause produces an ef-
fect, which becomes the next cause. So, depend-
ing on one cause, pratita, another cause is born, 
samutpada. This is called pratitya-samutpada. The 
relation within a group of causes is called pratyay-
opanibandha. Every object has the characteristics 
of the four elements like the earth leading to the 
qualities of hardness, softness, heat, and motion. 
For instance, a seed gives birth to the sprout. The 
hardness of the sprout is derived from the element 
earth in the seed. The softness of the seed comes 
from the element water. The assimilation necessary 
for the birth of the sprout comes from the element 
fire. The element air gives the motion necessary 
for the sprout to come out of the seed. The group 
of these elements is the group of the experienced. 
There are five skandhas or aggregates that form 
the experience of a conscious being with the ex-
ternal objects. The rupa-skandha or the form-ag-
gregate is the sense-objects and the sense-organs 
taken together, that produce the cause for actions. 
The vijnana-skandha or the consciousness-aggre-
gate is the identification of the experience of the 
sense-objects through the sense-organs with I-con-
sciousness due to the influence of alaya-vijnana 
or the storage-consciousness. The experience of 
happiness and misery forms the vedana-skandha 
or the feeling-aggregate. When the experience of 
the sense-organs gets identified with a particular 
name or form and gets related thus to a particular 
sense-organ, like the eye sees a wooden elephant, 
the ears hear a drum, and the like; it is called sam-
jna-skandha or the perception-aggregate. The sam-
skara-skandha or mental-formations-aggregate 
consists of different emotions like attachment, 
aversion, delusion, righteousness, pride, and self-
conceit. The subject of all experience is alaya-vij-
nana, which is self-revealing and of the nature of 
a changeless knowledge, which is also called chitta 
or Atman. Anything that can be understood by the 
intellect, anything that can be spoken, and every-
thing other than that which has all three kinds of 
non-existence—prag-abhava, prior non-existence; 
pradhvamsa-abhava, posterior non-existence; and 
atyanta-abhava, absolute non-existence—is all 
momentary. The dictum, ‘Whatever exists is mo-
mentary like the lightning—all that exists’, estab-
lishes the momentariness of everything. 
Here the question is: ‘O dull and evil-minded 
Buddhists, is all this baseless imagination of yours 
meant to turn away simple spiritual aspirants 
from the Vedic path or is it for the entertainment 
of the stupid?’ Here the question is indirect, to 
show that the ridiculous standpoint does not 
even warrant a direct confrontation. People with 
arguments that are completely against the Vedas 
are not worthy of being directly addressed to. It 
has been said: ‘One should not honour, even by 
a greeting, heretics, men who follow forbidden 
occupations, men who live like cats, rogues, logi-
cians (arguing against the Veda), and those who 
live like herons.’1 Utterances that have no proof 
or base and are made out of delusion should al-
ways be looked down upon. That is why this verse 
is in a derogatory tone. The implication is that 
the Buddhists here do not understand their own 
good and yet they denounce others’ viewpoints. 
The contention raised against the Buddhists 
here is: what is the means of knowledge that led 
them to form their conclusions? It cannot be 
direct perception since this method of know-
ledge accepts the reality of the sense-objects but 
the transient atoms are not permanent in sense-
objects. The method of knowledge adopted by 
the Buddhists cannot be inference also because 
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inference needs invariable concomitance. How-
ever, since both the objects perceived and the 
senses cannot be attributed anything more than a 
momentary existence, their invariable concomi-
tance becomes impossible. Similar is the case 
with other means of knowledge like presump-
tion, and so on, because these are not accepted 
by the Buddhists. Then by what uncommon, un-
heard of, thoughtful proof, by what imagined 
seventh sense-organ has this conclusion been 
arrived at? Or has such conclusion been made 
just to prove that one is separate and unique; 
just to assert one’s ego? Is it like saying: ‘Though 
it is against all means of knowledge, since I have 
independence to think, so I assert my opinion 
thus’? This is like the blabbering of fools. 
Till now the baselessness of the arguments of 
the Buddhists has been established. Now, the de-
fects in their arguments are being shown.
mebIeerYeeJe: keâLebJee ÛeueveefJejefnCeeb Ye”ÏjeCeeceCetveeb
mebIeesÓvevÙe: keâLebJee efJe<eÙeheoefceÙeelkeâMÛe mebIeb efJeOeòes~
mkebâOeeveeb meefVeheele: keâLeefceJe efkeâÙeleeb Yeeskeäle=lee keâeÛe Oeeje 
keâmÙe mleeb Yeesiecees#eew Jeo pe[ 
meHeâueb kesâve Jee oMe&veb les ~~ 1.23 ~~
Sanghibhavah kathamva chalanavirahinam 
bhanguranamanunam 
Sangho’nanyah kathamva vishayapadamiyat
kashcha sangham vidhatte.
Skandhanam sannipatah kathamiva kiyatam 
bhoktrita kacha dhara 
Kasya stam bhogamokshau vada jada saphalam 
kena va darshanam te. (1.23)
How can the atoms—that are without ac-
tion because of the impossibility of a cause 
and have actions that destroy in a moment 
because they are momentary—come together 
in a group in the body and the like? How can 
this body, that is just a group of atoms ac-
cording to you, be perceived by the senses? 
And since you do not accept any conscious 
principle other than this mass of atoms, who 
would bring about the different combinations 
of the elements? How will the grouping of 
the skandhas be done? Which skandhas can 
experience? What is the nature of your vij-
nana-dhara, a continuous flow of momentary 
discrete units of knowledge connected with 
the ego? Who would experience and who 
would get moksha? O stupid, tell me how can 
your philosophy be successful?
Refuting the Vaisheshikas, we held that action-
less atoms cannot form dyads and triads. Here too, 
how can actionless atoms form a group like the 
body, as such formation would be causeless. The 
Buddhists say that even if atoms were permanent, 
they would be actionless, more so since they are 
momentary. Further, is this Buddhists’ grouping 
of atoms, different from or similar to grouping of 
atoms in objects like a pot? If it is different, then 
it would be an erroneous conclusion against their 
own stand. And if it is similar, then such coming 
together would be imperceptible by the senses. 
Objection: Individual strands of hair are not 
seen from a distance but the entire group of hairs 
is seen, similarly it could be held that the individ-
ual atoms cannot be perceived by the senses but 
the entire group of atoms can be perceived.
Reply: No, that is not a plausible argument. In 
the case of hairs, the individual strands are also 
visible from close proximity. An object does not 
become imperceptible because of defects like 
improper eyesight or distance. However, the ob-
jects in question are held to be naturally imper-
ceptible even as a group, just like one cannot see 
a group of air molecules. Further, the insenti-
ent atoms can come together only under a sen-
tient being just like a bundle of grass or a heap 
of grains can be created only by a sentient being. 
Since you do not accept a sentient doer, the com-
ing together of atoms can also be not accepted. 
(To be continued)
References
 1. Manusmriti, 4.30.
